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We Blame Innocent Victims More Than I Do: 
Self-Construal Level Moderates Responses 
to Just-World Threats
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Utrecht University
is severely harmed and continues to suffer following the 
incident that happened or when a perpetrator is not 
caught for the crime committed and thus unfairly escapes 
punishment (Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007; Hafer, 
2000a). Just-world theory predicts that, in situations of 
this sort, people seek to defend their belief that the 
world generally is a just place. Such just-world defense 
can take on various forms, such as defense in the form 
of action (e.g., endorsing revenge on the perpetrator; 
Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2004) or cognition (e.g., psycho-
logically reconstructing a moral transgression so that 
it no longer appears to be unjust; Lerner, 1980). A well-
documented indication of this latter process can be 
found in people’s responses to innocent victims of unjust 
events. An innocent victim of a harmful unjust event 
poses a threat to the belief that people usually get what 
they deserve, and people may hence buffer themselves 
against this psychological threat by assigning part of 
the blame to the victim. Consequently, innocent vic-
tims are no longer perceived as innocent, but instead, 
they are perceived as to some extent deserving of their 
fates. Thus, paradoxically, victim blaming originates 
from a concern for justice.
An important issue that has inspired justice research is 
why people have this need to defend themselves against 
the possibility that the world sometimes may not be just 
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This study investigated the impact of self-construal lev-
els on people’s tendency to blame innocent victims for 
the victims’ fates. The authors hypothesized that when 
the belief in a just world is threatened, social self-
construal is associated with more victim blaming than 
individual self-construal is. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants were primed with either the individual self 
(with the word I) or the social self (with the word we). 
Results indeed showed that when threats to just-world 
beliefs were high, social self-activation produced more 
victim blaming than individual self-activation did. This 
effect was not found when just-world threats were low. 
Extending on these findings, Experiment 3 revealed 
that, following a just-world threat, an independent self-
construal measure was negatively related to victim 
blaming, and an interdependent self-construal measure 
was positively related to victim blaming. It is concluded 
that self-construal levels are important to understanding 
the justice motive.
Keywords: victim blaming; self-construal level; just-world 
theory; justice motive
People are motivated to perceive the surrounding social world as a just place where good things hap-
pen to good people and bad things happen to bad 
people. This justice motive is at the core of just-world 
theory, which stipulates that people have a need to 
believe that people generally get what they deserve in 
life (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966; for recent reviews, see Hafer & Bègue, 
2005; Ross & Miller, 2002). Social situations can pose a 
threat to this belief, such as when an innocent individual 
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and, hence, may sometimes blame innocent victims. In 
answering this question, it is generally asserted that just-
world beliefs constitute “fundamental delusions” that 
serve the psychological function to maintain or increase 
the extent to which people experience the social world 
as predictable and consistent (Lerner, 1980). In keeping 
with this desire to make sense of the social world, the 
dominant explanation of phenomena such as victim 
blaming is that upholding the belief in a just world 
validates people’s confidence that it is useful for them to 
strive for long-term goals in life (see also Hafer, 2000b). 
As noted by Hafer and Bègue (2005), if people did not 
believe in a just world, there would be “little point in 
investing time, energy, and other resources in the hopes 
of obtaining the rewards one believes one deserves” 
(p. 130). This functionality of just-world beliefs is cor-
roborated by findings that just-world beliefs are posi-
tively associated with psychological well-being (e.g., 
Dalbert, 1998; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996). 
Furthermore, Lerner and Miller (1978) have suggested 
that victim blaming originates from self-oriented motives: 
When people observe injustices that happen to others, 
they need to shield themselves from the cognition that 
their own well-being is vulnerable to factors that are 
beyond their control. Such self-orientation in justice 
motivation was observed by Lerner and Miller when 
they remarked the following:
People will be concerned primarily with their own 
world, the environment in which they must live and 
function. To witness and admit to injustices in other 
environments does not threaten people very much 
because these events have little relevance for their own 
fates. As events become closer to their world, however, 
the concern over injustices increases greatly, as does the 
need to explain or make sense of the events. (p. 1031)
This quote suggests that victim blaming originates 
from a desire to regulate and protect one’s own well-
being in response to unjust events that one perceives 
happening to others (Correia et al., 2007; see also 
IJzerman & Van Prooijen, 2008; Lambert, Burroughs, & 
Nguyen, 1999). Moreover, the implications for observ-
ers’ well-being are more pronounced to the extent that 
they perceive themselves as more similar to the victim. 
Building on these insights, the present research sought 
to investigate the social-cognitive implications of this 
process by focusing on self-construal level, that is, the 
way people define themselves in relation to others. In 
particular, people can mentally define themselves in 
terms of their interpersonal relations and similarities 
with others, or they can define themselves in terms of 
their own unique features and their differences with 
others (e.g., Brewer, 1991). Here, we propose that such 
levels of self-construal influence victim blaming in pre-
dictable ways. As such, the present research is designed 
to investigate core assumptions of just-world theory by 
empirically testing the relation between victim blaming 
and self-construal level. In the following, we more 
elaborately introduce the constructs that motivated the 
present contribution and derive our hypotheses.
Self-ConStrual level 
and viCtim Blaming
People can conceive of themselves at various levels. 
The most common distinction of self-construal level is 
between the individual self and the social self. These lev-
els of self-construal operate relatively independent from 
each other (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, 
& Iuzzini, 2002; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The indi-
vidual self is the part of the self-concept that differentiates 
the self from others and stresses the individual’s unique-
ness, and the social self is the part of the self-concept that 
assimilates the self with others and stresses similarities 
with other people. Both these self-conceptualizations are 
an integral part of people’s self-concepts and can be 
made more or less accessible through contextual factors 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 
2009). In addition, people can vary structurally in these 
levels of self-construal, which is evidenced by the fact 
that these two levels of self-construal are frequently 
assessed as individual difference variables (e.g., Singelis, 
1994, who referred to these dimensions as independent 
vs. interdependent self-construal) or as cultural dimen-
sions that correspond to the distinction between indi-
vidualistic versus collectivistic cultures (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).
These distinctions between the individual (or inde-
pendent) self versus the social (or interdependent) self can 
be expected to have implications for people’s responses to 
various types of injustices that they perceive in their 
direct social environment. When the social self is salient, 
people are in a mind-set that assimilates the self with 
others. Such an assimilative mind-set is likely to increase 
the commitment that people feel toward others, who 
then psychologically are experienced as an extension of 
the self (Gardner, Gabriel, & Hochschild, 2002). A likely 
consequence of this process is that people are increas-
ingly attentive to injustices that they observe happened 
to others. More specifically, social self-activation leads 
people to psychologically connect the self to others, and 
as a consequence, injustices done to others are likely to 
be indirectly experienced as targeted toward the self 
(Lerner & Miller, 1978; see also Smith & Citti, 2006). 
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Empirical research provides evidence that stronger social 
connections indeed increase the need for justice. For 
instance, Gollwitzer and Bücklein (2007) found evidence 
that social self-construals are associated with more puni-
tive attitudes toward norm violators. These findings cor-
respond to intergroup research that reveals a tendency 
for people to be more punitive toward ingroup than 
outgroup offenders (e.g., Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & 
Weathers, 1995; Van Prooijen, 2006; Van Prooijen & 
Lam, 2007).
Such an increased need for justice is likely to hold 
implications for people’s responses to innocent victims 
who are threatening to just-world beliefs. Social self-
construal can make innocent victims seem particularly 
threatening to just-world beliefs by emphasizing the fact 
that similar others are vulnerable to uncontrollable 
harm, which reminds observers of the unpredictability 
of their own fates. Consistent with this line of reason-
ing, Correia et al. (2007) found that an innocent victim 
threatened just-world beliefs more if the victim was an 
ingroup than an outgroup member, as evidenced by 
results from a modified Stroop task (Hafer, 2000a). In a 
similar vein, Novak and Lerner (1968) investigated par-
ticipants’ responses to another participant who was 
similar or dissimilar to them in terms of various atti-
tudes. Following the information that this similar or 
dissimilar other recently had suffered a mental break-
down, participants displayed avoidance behaviors par-
ticularly if the other was similar to them. Of importance, 
the main factor that is assumed to drive these effects is 
the cognitive similarity that people observe between the 
self and a stranger, not the emotional closeness that 
people may experience with a known victim—after all, 
it seems unlikely that people are more prone to blame 
emotionally close others (e.g., their spouses or children). 
Keeping this boundary condition in mind, the research 
findings reviewed here are consistent with our general 
argument that when people are in a mind-set that cog-
nitively integrates the self with others, they are more in 
need to defend themselves against just-world threats. 
Based on this line of reasoning, it can be predicted that 
social self-construal leads to more victim blaming 
when confronted with a victim who is threatening to 
just-world beliefs.
A different pattern of results may be expected in the 
case of individual self-construal. Individual self-construal 
produces a mind-set that differentiates the self from oth-
ers by emphasizing one’s own uniqueness. Such focus on 
one’s own individual attributes may lead observers not 
to experience the events that happened to others as 
threatening. It has been noted that people frequently do 
not experience injustices as threatening when they hap-
pen outside of their direct social environment. People 
are then able to maintain that their “own” world is just 
and that the injustice that they perceived happened in a 
“different” world (see, e.g., the above quote by Lerner 
& Miller, 1978, p. 1031). Indeed, it is likely that a mind-
set that differentiates the self from others produces a 
decreased need to defend the self against the observed 
injustice: One may infer that injustices are only likely to 
happen to people who are clearly different from them-
selves. This may even be somewhat reassuring, as it 
allows individuals to acknowledge the existence of injus-
tice in the world, while simultaneously being able to 
believe in the justness of one’s own direct social environ-
ment. As a consequence, threats to the just world may 
not be experienced as problematic when the individual 
self is activated, and hence, it can be predicted that indi-
vidual self-construal weakens the potential for victim 
blaming. In three experiments, we tested these hypothe-
sized effects of self-construal levels on victim blaming in 
response to just-world threats.
exPeriment 1
In Experiment 1, we investigated the influence of 
various levels of self-construal on victim blaming by 
priming participants either with the word I (individ-
ual self-activation) or with the word we (social self-
activation). Also, we added a third (control) condition 
to the self-construal manipulation in which neither the 
individual nor the social self was activated. The priming 
procedure that we used was developed in previous stud-
ies and has been shown to successfully elicit responses 
that are associated with the individual self versus the 
social self (see, e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner 
et al., 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Van Prooijen & 
Zwenk, 2009).
Following the self-construal manipulation, partici-
pants were confronted with a description of a young 
woman who experienced a sexual assault. In this descrip-
tion, building on well-established just-world manipula-
tions (e.g., Hafer, 2000a, 2000b; Lerner & Miller, 1978), 
we manipulated the extent to which the incident would 
be regarded as threatening to just-world beliefs by vary-
ing whether the suffering of the victim continued or 
ended (Hafer, 2000a, 2000b; Lerner & Miller, 1978). 
The idea behind this procedure is that information that 
the suffering of a victim ended resolves the initial just-
world threat of the victimization incident to some extent: 
After all, such information suggests that the victim was 
not harmed dramatically, enabling people to reconcile 
the victimization incident with their implicit belief that 
“truly” bad things do not happen to good people—even 
though good people can be somewhat unfortunate occa-
sionally. In the low just-world threat condition, par-
ticipants were informed that, because of the help of her 
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friends, the young woman recovered well soon after the 
incident. In the high just-world threat condition, no such 
information was provided, suggesting that the woman 
continued to suffer (e.g., Hafer, 2000b). Based on the 
line of reasoning described above, we anticipated that 
the self-construal manipulation would influence victim 
blaming, especially in the condition where the victim 
was threatening to just-world beliefs (i.e., the condition 
where participants did not receive information about the 
victim’s recovery). In particular, we predicted that social 
self-activation would lead to more victim blaming than 
individual self-activation would when the victim posed a 
high threat to just-world beliefs.
Method
Participants and design. We assigned 115 participants 
(36 men, 79 women; age M  = 20.57, SD = 3.36) ran-
domly to the conditions of a 3 (self-construal activation: 
I vs. we vs. control) × 2 (just-world threat: low vs. high) 
factorial design. Participants were recruited using flyers 
in the VU University student cafeterias. The experiment 
was followed by two other, unrelated studies. The three 
studies together lasted approximately 20 minutes, and 
participants were paid €2.50 for their participation.
Procedure. Upon entry in the laboratory, participants 
were seated in separate cubicles. Each cubicle contained 
a personal computer, monitor, and keyboard that were 
used to present the stimulus information and to register 
the data. Participants were told that they would par-
ticipate in two separate studies. The first study was 
presented as a reading exercise. This reading exercise 
contained the self-construal manipulation. Building on 
earlier studies that successfully used similar operation-
alizations of self-activation (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 
1996; Gardner et al., 1999; Stapel & Koomen, 2001; 
Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009), participants were asked 
to read a text about a trip to the city. In the I condition, 
this text was written in the first-person singular (e.g., 
“I love the city. To me, the city is a place to enjoy. . . .”). 
In the we condition, the text was written in the first-
person plural (e.g., “We love the city. To us, the city is a 
place to enjoy. . . .”). Following earlier studies, partici-
pants in both conditions were instructed to count and 
indicate the total number of personal pronouns in the 
text (both conditions contained an equal number of 
personal pronouns). In the control condition, all per-
sonal pronouns in the text were replaced by a string of 
letters (e.g., “ABC loves the city. To XYZ, the city is a 
place to enjoy. . . . ”) or by the word it. Participants in 
the control condition were instructed to count and indi-
cate the total number of times these strings of letters, in 
conjunction with the word it, appeared in the text.
After the reading exercise, participants continued 
with the second study in which they read a text that 
described how a young woman (Jolanda) suffered an 
unpleasant sexual experience. The text in the high just-
world threat condition read as follows:
Jolanda is at a party where she meets a boy. Jolanda and 
the boy start flirting passionately. They have a lot of fun 
together and drink several glasses of wine. When the party 
comes to an end, the boy offers to bring Jolanda home. 
However, instead of driving her straight home, the boy 
stops the car when they are driving through a park. 
Despite the fact that Jolanda tries to resist him, the boy 
tries to have sex with Jolanda. Eventually, the attempt 
of the boy to have sex with Jolanda fails, but Jolanda 
has experienced this incident as a sexual assault. After 
this incident, the boy brings Jolanda home.
In the low just-world threat condition, the final sentence 
of this text was extended with the following information:
After this incident, the boy brings Jolanda home, where 
she is being taken care of by her roommates. They help 
Jolanda, and consequently, Jolanda suffers less because 
of this incident and, eventually, recovers reasonably well 
soon after the incident.
To measure victim blaming, we asked participants to 
indicate to what extent they agreed with the following 
four statements: “I believe that what happened to Jolanda 
was caused by her own behavior,” “I believe that Jolanda 
is responsible herself for what happened to her,” “I think 
Jolanda deserved what happened to her,” and “I think 
Jolanda has been very careless” (1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). These items were averaged into a reli-
able victim-blaming scale (α = .71). The manipulation 
was checked with the following question: “Jolanda recov-
ered well soon after this incident” (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree). After this, participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid for participation.
Results and Discussion
Sex of participant. Including the sex of the participants 
as an independent variable in the analyses of all three 
experiments reported here yielded no main or interaction 
effects on the manipulation checks or dependent varia-
bles. Although sex effects on victim blaming are some-
times found (e.g., Kleinke & Meyer, 1990), these effects 
are generally not very reliable (Hafer & Bègue, 2005), 
and the present three experiments revealed no reliable sex 
effects.1
Manipulation check. The check of the just-world 
threat manipulation was analyzed with a 3 (self-construal 
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activation) × 2 (just-world threat) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). This analysis yielded only the predicted 
main effect of the just-world manipulation, F(1, 109) = 
36.00, p < .001. Participants in the low-threat condi-
tion were more in agreement with the statement that 
Jolanda recovered well after the incident (M = 4.87, 
SD = 1.38) than were participants in the high-threat 
condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.24). These findings sug-
gest that participants perceived the just-world manipu-
lation as intended.
Victim blaming. The means and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 1. A 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed the 
predicted interaction only, F(2, 109) = 3.15, p < .05. 
Simple main effect analyses indicated that the level of 
self-construal activation exerted no influence on victim 
blaming when just-world threat was low, F < 1. When 
just-world threat was high, however, self-construal acti-
vation significantly influenced victim blaming, F(2, 109) = 
3.14, p < .05. We then conducted contrast analyses 
within the high just-world threat conditions. Supporting 
our hypothesis, these analyses indicated that partici-
pants in the individual self condition reported less victim 
blaming than did participants in the social self condition, 
F(1, 109) = 6.24, p < .02 (see Table 1). The contrast that 
pitted the individual self condition against the control 
condition was not significant, F(1, 109) = 1.87, p > .17, 
nor was the contrast of the social self condition against 
the control condition, F(1, 109) = 1.21, p > .27. These 
latter analyses indicated that the level of victim blaming 
in the control condition was intermediate between the 
individual and social self conditions, which suggests that 
both the individual and social self conditions contributed 
to their relative difference in victim blaming.
The results supported our hypotheses such that 
social self-activation produced more victim blaming 
than individual self-activation did in situations where a 
victim is threatening to just-world beliefs. Furthermore, 
no effects of self-construal activation were found in the 
condition where the victim was not threatening to just-
world beliefs, which is consistent with the theoretical 
framework presented here given that participants are not 
strongly in need of reestablishing a sense of justice in the 
low-threat condition (Hafer, 2000a). As such, the level of 
blaming among participants in the low-threat condition 
is not likely to depend on just-world defensive processes 
but, rather, on other characteristics of the situation that 
were held constant across conditions (e.g., the fact that 
the victim initially flirted with the boy in the scenario).
exPeriment 2
The results of Experiment 1 were promising, and 
hence, we conducted a second experiment to establish 
the robustness of the findings. In this second experiment, 
we tested the same hypothesis when participants were 
confronted with a different just-world threat. Participants 
were confronted with a description of a young woman 
who was violently robbed of her handbag. Following 
Hafer (2000a), we manipulated the extent to which the 
incident would be regarded as threatening to just-world 
beliefs by varying whether the perpetrator was caught. 
This procedure varies whether the initial threat to the 
just world posed by the robbery was resolved by provid-
ing information that the perpetrator got what he deserved 
(i.e., bad things happening to bad people), partially rec-
tifying the injustice of the incident. In the low-threat 
condition, participants read that the perpetrator was 
caught and handed over to the police; in the high-threat 
condition, participants did not receive this information, 
suggesting that the offender was not caught.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 108 participants 
(32 men, 76 women; age M = 20.58, SD = 2.62) were 
assigned randomly to the conditions of a 3 (self-construal 
activation: I vs. we vs. control) × 2 (just-world threat: 
low vs. high) factorial design. Participants were recruited 
using flyers in the cafeterias of the VU University 
Amsterdam. The experiment was preceded by a differ-
ent, unrelated study. The two studies lasted approxi-
mately 30 minutes, and participants were paid €3.50 for 
participation.
Procedure. Participants were welcomed in the same 
laboratory as in Experiment 1 and again participated 
in two ostensibly unrelated studies. The self-construal 
manipulation (Study 1) was the same as in Experiment 1. 
After the reading exercise, participants continued with 
Study 2, in which they were presented with a text that 
described the victimization of a woman (Jeanette). This 
description contained the manipulation of just-world 
threat. The description read as follows:
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Reported Victim 
Blaming as a Function of Self-Construal Activation and 
Just-World Threat (Experiment 1)
 Self-Construal Activation
 I Control We
Just-World    
Threat M SD M SD M SD
Low 3.41 1.16 3.20 1.09 3.06 1.18
High 2.71 0.81 3.23 1.15 3.63 1.26
NOTE: Higher means indicate more victim blaming.
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After a night out on the town, Jeanette is waiting for the 
night bus at 4 a.m. Her friends had offered to drive her 
home safely, but Jeanette did not believe that to be nec-
essary given that she frequently takes the night bus 
home. She is standing next to a good-looking boy to 
whom she smiles briefly. The bus arrives and all the 
people who were waiting step into the bus. Jeanette 
takes her purse out of her handbag to show her ticket to 
the bus driver and finds a place to sit. She puts her purse 
back into her handbag, checks whether she still has her 
keys, and takes out her mobile phone to call some 
friends. When the bus stops, Jeanette walks the last few 
blocks home. Right before arriving at her front door, 
she suddenly is hit on her head from behind and falls to 
the floor. Her handbag is pulled out of her hands, and 
just before going unconscious, she sees the boy from the 
bus stop running away with her handbag.
In the low-threat condition, the following information 
was added to this description:
As Jeanette regained consciousness, two men were help-
ing her who, as it turned out, had seen everything, had 
stopped the perpetrator, and had turned him over to the 
police.
In the high-threat condition, this sentence was not 
added, and hence, the perpetrator had not been caught 
in that condition (Hafer, 2000a).
Participants then were posed a number of questions 
regarding the text they just read. To measure victim 
blaming, participants responded to the following two 
questions: “I think that Jeanette has been very careless” 
and “I believe that Jeanette behaved foolishly” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). These two items 
were averaged into a reliable victim-blaming scale (α = 
.80). To check the manipulation of just-world threat, 
participants responded to three items (1 = certainly not, 
7 = certainly): “Do you believe the perpetrator will 
receive his just deserts?” “Do you think the perpetrator 
will be punished?” and “Do you think that the perpetra-
tor will get the punishment he deserves?” (α = .92). 
After this, participants were informed that the study 
had ended. They were debriefed, thanked, and paid for 
their participation.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. The manipulation check of the 
just-world threat manipulation was analyzed by means 
of a 3 (self-construal activation) × 2 (just-world threat) 
ANOVA. This analysis yielded the predicted main effect 
of the just-world threat manipulation only, F(1, 102) = 
13.47, p < .001. Participants in the low-threat condition 
believed it to be more likely that the perpetrator would 
get what he deserves (M = 5.22, SD = 1.21) than did 
participants in the high-threat condition (M = 4.21, 
SD = 1.64). Perceptions of deservingness are at the core 
of just-world beliefs (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 
1980), and hence, these findings suggest that partici-
pants perceived the manipulation of just-world threat as 
intended.
Victim blaming. The means and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 2. A 3 × 2 ANOVA on the victim-
blaming scale revealed a significant main effect of self-
construal activation, F(2, 102) = 5.73, p < .01. Post hoc 
testing (Tukey’s HSD test) indicated that victim blam-
ing was higher following activation of the social self 
(M = 3.61, SD = 1.68) as compared to activation of the 
individual self (M = 2.53, SD = 1.30) and the control 
condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.51; ps < .05). The indi-
vidual self condition did not differ significantly from the 
control condition (p = .88).
More important was the finding that this main effect 
was qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(2, 102) = 
3.32, p < .05. Similar to Experiment 1, self-construal 
activation did not influence victim blaming when the 
threat to just-world beliefs was low, F(2, 102) = 1.49, 
p > .23, and it did significantly influence victim blaming 
when the threat to just-world beliefs was high, F(2, 102) = 
7.48, p < .01. We then conducted contrast analyses to 
establish which of the self-construal activation condi-
tions differed within the high just-world threat condition. 
The contrast between the individual versus social self 
conditions was significant, F(1, 102) = 14.96, p < .001, 
indicating that activation of the social self produced 
more victim blaming in comparison with activation of 
the individual self following a just-world threat (see 
Table 2). The contrast of the control condition versus the 
social self condition was significant, F(1, 102) = 4.10,
p < .05, and the contrast of the control condition versus 
the individual self condition approached significance, 
F(1, 102) = 3.60, p = .06. Thus, relative to the control 
condition, a threat to just-world beliefs increased vic-
tim blaming following social self activation, and it 
tended to decrease victim blaming following individual 
self activation.
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Reported Victim 
Blaming as a Function of Self-Construal Activation and 
Just-World Threat (Experiment 2)
 Self-Construal Activation
 I Control We
Just-World    
Threat M SD M SD M SD
Low 2.84 1.50 2.31 1.27 3.13 1.67
High 2.19 0.99 3.11 1.65 4.08 1.59
NOTE: Higher means indicate more victim blaming.
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The results of Experiment 2 were generally consistent 
with the findings observed in Experiment 1. Again, when 
confronted with a victim who is threatening to just-
world beliefs, participants were more inclined to blame 
the victim when the social self was activated than when 
the individual self was activated. Furthermore, victim 
blaming in the control condition was again intermediate 
between the individual and social self conditions in 
response to a just-world threat. In Experiment 2, these 
differences were more pronounced than in Experiment 1 
in that participants in the control condition differed sig-
nificantly from the individual and social self conditions 
in reported victim blaming. A possible explanation for 
this is that the nature of the offense and the just-world 
threat manipulation in Experiment 2 may have consti-
tuted a more severe threat to participants’ just-world 
beliefs than in Experiment 1. As a consequence, there was 
more leeway given in the self-construal activation manip-
ulation to influence victim blaming when the threat to 
just-world beliefs was high. Finally, self-construal activa-
tion again did not influence victim blaming in the condi-
tion where the victim posed a low threat to just-world 
beliefs. In sum, evidence for the hypotheses replicated 
across two different types of just-world threat, suggest-
ing that the present findings are robust manifestations of 
the influence of social versus individual self-construal 
activation on victim blaming. To further extend these 
findings, we conducted a third experiment.
exPeriment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to extend the previous 
findings in two significant ways. First, in Experiments 1 
and 2, the hypotheses were tested by activating social and 
individual levels of self-construal in a rather abstract way. 
To determine whether the hypothesis is corroborated 
using a different operationalization of self-construal level, 
in Experiment 3 we assessed the self-construal scales by 
Singelis (1994). These self-construal scales constitute a 
relatively less abstract conceptualization than the prim-
ing procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2, given that 
the Singelis scales refer to ingroup members who are 
personally known by the participant (importantly, in 
our experiment these known ingroup members did not 
pertain to the victim, given that the scales were meas-
ured in advance and were presented as a separate study). 
As such, these scales provide a more concrete operation-
alization of the constructs of interest here by measur-
ing the extent to which people structurally emphasize 
their uniqueness from known others (independent self-
construal) and their connectedness with known others 
(interdependent self-construal) as two separate dimen-
sions. The self-construal scales converge with the more 
generic priming procedure of Experiments 1 and 2 by 
focusing on the extent to which people assimilate versus 
differentiate the self with others. Indeed, a recent empir-
ical study found that the self-construal scales and primes 
showed interactive effects in a way that suggests these 
dispositional and situational variables to be functionally 
equivalent (Gollwitzer & Bücklein, 2007, Experiment 2). 
Furthermore, like the self-construal primes in Experiments 
1 and 2 (Gardner et al., 1999), the self-construal scales 
are closely associated with cultural dimensions of indi-
vidualism and collectivism (Singelis, 1994). These con-
siderations support the assumption that the self-construal 
scales and self-construal primes have convergent valid-
ity and that both procedures are useful to gather insights 
in the psychological consequences of how the self is 
construed in relation to others. Hence, these scales are 
well suited to test whether the processes that we hypoth-
esized in the introduction materialize in a different research 
setting.
The second contribution of Experiment 3 is to further 
examine what level of self-construal is the dominant 
force driving the effects: Is the social self increasing the 
potential for victim blaming, is the individual self decreas-
ing the potential for victim blaming, or both? Given that 
independent and interdependent self-construal are meas-
ured as separate dimensions, Experiment 3 is likely to 
reveal evidence of what level of self-construal shapes the 
blaming of victims. Building on our line of reasoning laid 
out in the introduction, and informed by the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2, we expected that both levels of 
self-construal would exert independent effects on victim 
blaming. Thus, we expected that, in response to a just-
world threat, high levels of independent self-construal 
would be associated with less victim blaming, and high 
levels of interdependent self-construal would be associ-
ated with more victim blaming.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 105 participants 
(41 men, 64 women; age M = 20.82, SD = 3.97) answered 
the independent and interdependent self-construal meas-
ures (Singelis, 1994) as our continuous independent 
variables and were assigned randomly to one of the 
conditions of our just-world threat manipulation (low 
vs. high threat). The participants were again recruited 
using flyers in the student cafeterias of VU University 
Amsterdam. The experiment was preceded and fol-
lowed by other, unrelated studies. Together, the studies 
lasted approximately 1 hour, and participants were paid 
€7 for participation.
Procedure. The experiment took place in the same 
laboratory as in Experiments 1 and 2. The experiment 
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was presented as two separate studies. In Study 1, we 
measured independent and interdependent self-construal 
by means of the Singelis (1994) self-construal scales. 
These scales are composed of two validated 12-item 
scales designed to measure independent and interdepend-
ent self-construal. Example items of the independent self-
construal scale are “I enjoy being unique and different 
from others in many respects” and “I act the same way 
no matter who I am with” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). The 12 items were averaged into a scale 
with a Cronbach’s alpha that was acceptable for the cur-
rent purposes (α = .65; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Example items of the interdependent self-construal scale 
are “My happiness depends on the happiness of those 
around me” and “I will stay in a group if they need me, 
even when I am not happy with the group” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). These 12 items were aver-
aged into a reliable scale (α = .77). The independent and 
interdependent self-construal scales were moderately and 
positively correlated (r = .30, p < .01).
After this, participants continued with Study 2, in 
which they were confronted with the same description, 
containing the same just-world threat manipulation, as 
in Experiment 2. To get an indication of the robustness 
of the present findings, we examined whether the 
hypotheses could be corroborated on a different indica-
tor of victim blaming. Hence, participants responded to 
two different items than in Experiment 2: “I believe that 
Jeanette behaved irresponsibly in her situation” and “I 
believe that Jeanette should have known better” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). These two items 
were averaged into a victim-blaming scale with accept-
able reliability (α = .67; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994).2 To check the manipulation of just world threat, 
the same three questions as in Experiment 1 were posed 
(α = .91). Participants were then informed that the 
experiment was ended. They were debriefed, thanked, 
and paid for their participation.
Results and Discussion
Statistical analyses. The results were analyzed by 
means of hierarchical regression analyses. Following 
Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the independ-
ent and interdependent self-construal scales were cen-
tered, and the conditions of the just-world threat 
manipulation were effect coded (–1 for the low-threat 
condition and 1 for the high-threat condition). The two 
predicted interaction terms (Independent Self-Construal 
× Just-World Threat and Interdependent Self-Construal 
× Just-World Threat) were based on the products of the 
centered self-construal scales and the effect-coded just-
world threat manipulation. The three main effects were 
specified in Step 1, and in Step 2 the two interaction 
terms were added to the regression model.
Manipulation check. The analysis on the manipula-
tion check revealed that only Step 1 was significant, 
F(3, 101) = 18.10, p < .001 (R2 = .35). As expected, only 
the just-world threat main effect was significant (β = 
–57, p < .001). Participants in the low-threat condition 
considered it to be more likely that the perpetrator would 
get what he deserved (M = 5.38, SD = 1.21) than did 
participants in the high-threat condition (M = 3.43, SD = 
1.51). This finding suggests that participants perceived 
the manipulation of just-world threat as intended.
Victim blaming. The results of the hierarchical regres-
sion analysis are displayed in Table 3. Step 1 was sig-
nificant, F(3, 101) = 3.58, p < .02 (R2 = .10). As can be 
seen in Table 3, both the manipulation of just-world 
threat and the interdependent self-construal scale exerted 
significant effects on victim blaming. More important was 
the finding that Step 2 also was significant, F(2, 99) = 
4.42, p < .02 (∆R2 = .07). As can be seen in Table 3, both 
predicted interactions were significant. The two interac-
tions are displayed graphically in Figure 1. Both interac-
tions were further examined by means of simple slopes 
analyses.
The interdependent Self-Construal × Just-World 
Threat interaction indicated that the interdependent 
self-construal scale had a positive influence on victim 
blaming when just-world threat was high (β = .28, p < 
.05), and it did not influence victim blaming when just-
world threat was low (β = .12, p = .38). As predicted, 
higher scores on the interdependent self-construal scale 
were associated with higher levels of victim blaming in 
response to a just-world threat.
The independent Self-Construal × Just-World Threat 
interaction showed that the independent self-construal 
scale had a negative influence on victim blaming when 
just-world threat was high (β = –.27, p < .06), and it did 
not influence victim blaming when just-world threat 
Table 3: Results From Regression Analyses: Victim Blaming as a 
Function of Independent Self-Construal, Interdependent 
Self-Construal, and Victim Blaming (Experiment 3)
Predictor  
Step 1 β t(101)
Just-world threat .25 2.62* 
Independent self-construal -.11 -1.12
Interdependent self-construal .21 2.11*
Step 2 β t(99)
Independent Self-Construal × -.27 -2.65**
  Just-World Threat
Interdependent Self-Construal × .21 2.04*
  Just-World Threat
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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was low (β = .12, p = .38). In accordance with predic-
tions, higher scores on the independent self-construal 
scale were associated with lower levels of victim blaming 
in response to a just-world threat. These findings corre-
spond to the hypothesis and the findings of Experiments 
1 and 2.
general diSCuSSion
Results of three experiments support the hypothesis 
that various levels of self-construal influence victim 
blaming in response to just-world threats. Experiments 1 
and 2 both revealed that, when confronted with a victim 
who poses a threat to just-world beliefs, activating the 
social self by means of a priming procedure produced 
higher levels of victim blaming than activating the indi-
vidual self. Furthermore, Experiment 3 replicated these 
findings by means of the most popular and well-known 
measure of individual differences pertaining to these 
self-construal levels (Singelis, 1994). This replication 
underscores the assertion of previous research that these 
individual difference measures have convergent validity 
with the priming procedures of Experiments 1 and 2 
(Gollwitzer & Bücklein, 2007) and provides further sup-
port for the notion that both self-construal levels exert 
independent effects on victim blaming. Taken together, 
these results provide solid support for the theoretical 
proposition that self-construal level predicts victim blam-
ing in response to just-world threats.
By integrating literature on self-construal level with 
literature on just-world beliefs, the present research 
sought to increase understanding into the underlying 
reasons why people sometimes blame innocent victims 
for the victims’ fates. The specific contribution of the 
experiments presented herein is twofold. First, the results 
presented here suggest that both self-construal levels 
exert independent effects on victim blaming. This was 
particularly evident in Experiment 3, wherein the indi-
vidual and social self were measured as two separate 
dimensions, and both dimensions influenced victim 
blaming in predictable ways. These findings are consist-
ent with arguments that the individual and social selves 
are mental representations that operate relatively inde-
pendent from each other (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Gaertner 
et al., 2002; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). The theoretical 
implication of this is that victim blaming is a multidi-
mensional self-regulatory process that depends in flexible 
ways on how people define themselves in relation to 
the surrounding social world. Second, the experiments 
revealed that differentiated versus assimilative mind-sets, 
which were either primed as abstract representations or 
measured as individual difference variables, influence 
victim blaming in ways that are consistent with the idea 
that the justice motive essentially is a self-oriented motive 
(Lambert et al., 1999; Montada, 1998). In particular, the 
findings presented here are consistent with a model in 
which people blame victims in order to psychologically 
cope with the idea that they themselves might also be 
vulnerable to uncontrollable harm (Lerner & Miller, 
1978). This reasoning provides a parsimonious explana-
tion for the finding that stimulating perceptions of 
similarity with others (by activating the social self) leads 
to a stronger rejection of victims who are threatening to 
just-world beliefs and that stimulating perceptions of 
uniqueness from others (by activating the individual 
self) decreases the potential for victim blaming.
At a broader theoretical level, this latter implication 
is in line with accumulating evidence that justice-based 
reasoning is shaped substantially by self-oriented con-
cerns. That is, different research studies suggest that 
decisional outcomes, decision-making procedures, or 
other solutions to a variety of social problems are consid-
ered to be more just to the extent that they hold more 
positive implications for the evaluator, either in material 
or immaterial terms (e.g., Epley & Caruso, 2004; Ham & 
Van den Bos, 2008; Hegtvedt, 2006; Messick & Sentis, 
1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992; Van Prooijen, 
2008; Van Prooijen et al., 2008). The present findings are 
consistent with these arguments in that victim-blaming 
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High just-world
threat
Low just-world
threat
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Independent self-construal
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Figure 1  Interdependent Self-Construal × Just-World Threat and 
Independent Self-Construal × Just-World Threat interac-
tions on victim blaming—Experiment 3.
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responses appear to originate from observers’ concern to 
protect the self from the cognition that they too might be 
vulnerable to uncontrollable harm. Although specula-
tive, one might argue that people are not consciously 
aware that they reject innocent victims to protect them-
selves from these unwanted cognitions. Such reasoning 
converges with original conceptions of just-world beliefs, 
as these beliefs are considered to be an implicit assump-
tion that people are not consciously aware of (Correia 
et al., 2007; Hafer, 2000a; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; 
Lerner, 1980). In addition, recent empirical evidence has 
revealed that justice-based situations stimulate auto-
matic and implicit activation of justice motivation, par-
ticularly if a given situation is self-relevant to perceivers, 
further suggesting that people are not necessarily con-
sciously aware of the self-oriented nature of their justice 
motivation (Ham & Van den Bos, 2008). These findings 
underscore that justice-based reasoning is rooted in 
implicit self-focused mental processes (cf. Lerner, 2003; 
Lerner & Miller, 1978).
Across three experiments, results revealed no main 
effects of the just-world threat manipulation on victim 
blaming. This finding reflects a continuing puzzle in 
just-world research: Researchers sometimes find main 
effects of just-world threat manipulations, but at other 
times, they only find two-way interactions (for an 
overview, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). These two-way 
interactions, then, often take the form of the justice 
motive being evident only in the condition where par-
ticipants’ beliefs in a just world are threatened (e.g., 
Hafer, 2000b). Although we do not claim nor aim to 
provide a definitive solution to this puzzle, we suspect 
that victim-blaming responses are sensitive to what we 
tentatively call “hidden ceiling effects.” In particular, we 
speculate that there often are substantial psychological 
limits to the maximum amount of blame that people are 
willing to assign to victims. Even when a victim argua-
bly behaved somewhat carelessly, people may still rec-
ognize that victims usually do not deliberately choose to 
harm themselves. As a consequence, participants may be 
reluctant to score extremely high on measures of victim 
blaming, even when just-world beliefs are threatened. 
Thus, the scale ceiling may be “hidden,” as it is not at 
the scale end. In keeping with this line of reasoning, the 
mean victim-blaming responses that are found in empir-
ical research often are around the scale midpoint and 
rarely take the form of extremely high scores (e.g., 
around 6 on a 7-point scale). Also in the present exper-
iments, we found evidence that participants were reluc-
tant to give high ratings on our measures of victim 
blaming.3 As such, it is possible that participants in the 
low-threat condition reported blaming responses that left 
little room to find an increase in victim blaming in the 
high-threat condition. These considerations, however, do 
not compromise the main conclusion of the present con-
tribution, which is that self-construal levels influence 
victim blaming in predictable ways when the belief in a 
just world is threatened.
The present findings are consistent with previous 
findings in which a sense of connectedness with others 
increased a concern for justice when observing social 
transgressions (e.g., Correia et al., 2007; Gollwitzer & 
Bücklein, 2007; Kerr et al., 1995; Novak & Lerner, 
1968; Van Prooijen, 2006; Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). 
This is not to say, however, that all forms of connected-
ness to others increase a concern for justice in all pos-
sible situations. For instance, the present findings pertain 
to a mind-set that leads people to seek cognitive similar-
ity with—or uniqueness from—others while evaluating 
a victim who is a stranger. It is doubtful whether these 
findings generalize to instances where people evaluate a 
victim that they know and care about. Indeed, 
Loewenstein and Small (2007) argued that feeling emo-
tionally close to a victim stimulates feelings of sympa-
thy, which is likely to decrease blaming. Furthermore, a 
recent empirical study indicated that people are more 
willing to compensate a victim for the harm done when 
they experience emotional proximity to the victim (Van 
Prooijen, in press). Thus, the conclusions of the present 
research only pertain to the influence of self-construal 
level when evaluating unknown victims. Another bound-
ary condition is that when people are victimized them-
selves, subsequent feelings of injustice may be associated 
with the individual self because victimization may lead 
people to feel that the perpetrator disrespects them for 
their own unique attributes. Recent empirical studies 
indeed found associations between justice concerns and 
individual self-activation when people were targeted 
themselves by acts of justice or injustice (Loseman, 
Miedema, Van den Bos, & Vermunt, 2009; Loseman, 
Van den Bos, & Ham, 2005; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 
2009). These recent findings, in conjunction with the 
present findings, may suggest an actor–observer differ-
ence in the relation between self-construal activation and 
justice considerations, such that social self-activation 
increases people’s concern for justice when they are 
observers, and individual self-activation increases peo-
ple’s concern for justice when they are the target of just 
or unjust acts. Future research may more directly exam-
ine this possibility.
The hypotheses were tested by means of brief descrip-
tions of offense deeds. This procedure is reminiscent 
of the distinction between “high” versus “low” impact 
stimuli to elicit just-world threats, which means that 
experimental stimuli need to be emotionally involving 
(high impact) in order to arouse concerns about justice. 
Lerner (1980, 2003) assumed that low-impact stimuli are 
problematic because they stimulate normative responses 
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of how participants believe they should, or are expected 
to, behave (i.e., demand characteristics). These argu-
ments have been taken to favor the use of vivid stimu-
lus materials, such as videotaped recordings, instead of 
written descriptions (e.g., Hafer & Bègue, 2005). We 
disagree with this perspective in two ways. First, 
although we concur that stimuli need to be emotion-
ally involving to elicit justice reasoning, it would be 
unjustified to dismiss the use of written descriptions as 
appropriate stimulus materials. In everyday life, peo-
ple’s justice concerns can be aroused very easily by 
short pieces of written text (e.g., newspaper articles or 
even fiction). Emotional involvement can be attained 
quite well with a brief but realistic description in which 
participants are able to imagine the victim’s perspec-
tive. Second, the main risk of emotionally uninvolving 
stimulus materials (low impact) is null results, not 
demand characteristics. When situations are not emo-
tionally involving, no justice-based reasoning is likely 
to emerge, leading researchers to not find evidence for 
hypotheses concerning justice-based psychological 
processes. Most experimental situations are far too 
abstract for participants to be able to guess what the 
experimenter might expect from them. It has been 
remarked that social psychologists tend to overestimate 
the risk of demand characteristics in laboratory experi-
ments (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). As to the cur-
rent research, it is hard to see how (for instance) the 
priming procedure of Experiments 1 and 2 could have 
possibly manipulated participants’ perception of what 
type of response the experimenter might expect from 
them. All in all, it is safe to conclude that the current 
stimulus materials were sufficiently involving to elicit 
genuine justice motivation.
ConCluSion
The present findings fit into a research tradition that 
seeks to examine one of the most paradoxical conse-
quences of people’s desire for justice, namely, the blam-
ing of innocent victims. By empirically connecting victim 
blaming to common manipulations and measures of 
self-construal level, three experiments provided support 
for core assumptions of the just-world theory. As such, 
whereas the social self sometimes may be associated 
with “prosocial” implications of justice concerns (such 
as punishment of offenders), at other times it may be 
associated with relatively more detrimental implications 
of the justice motive (i.e., the blaming of innocent vic-
tims). Taken together, it can be concluded that the way 
observers define themselves in relation to others predicts 
how they respond to victims who are threatening to the 
basic assumption that the world is a just place.
noteS
1. It is noteworthy that in our experiments the target victim was 
female, and hence, based on our theoretical argument one might 
expect more blaming among women when the just world is threat-
ened. This two-way interaction between participants’ sex and the 
just-world threat manipulation, however, did not approach signifi-
cance in any experiment, all Fs < 1. Furthermore, no reliable trends 
could be observed in the high-threat condition: for Experiment 1, 
male M = 3.12, SD = 1.13, female M = 3.24, SD = 1.18; for 
Experiment 2, male M = 3.62, SD = 1.88, female M = 2.98, SD = 
1.51; for Experiment 3, male M = 2.62, SD = 1.07, female M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.51. In all likelihood, categorizations based on sex instigate 
psychological processes that are relatively more complex than only 
experiencing a sense of cognitive similarity, particularly when a 
female is being victimized by a male. For instance, female partici-
pants may experience such a victimization as targeted at females in 
general, producing identity threats in conjunction with emotional 
reactions such as increased anger at the male perpetrator and feel-
ings of empathy with the victim. These relatively more complex 
psychological dynamics may obscure the impact of the cognitive 
similarity that female participants experience with the female vic-
tim. In addition, it can be noted that in all experiments the number 
of male participants was relatively low, further obscuring possible sex 
effects. Given the statistical nonsignificance of this factor, in all the 
analyses reported below we dropped sex of the participant as inde-
pendent variable.
2. Although we are unsure why the alpha level for the victim-
blaming scale was relatively low in Experiment 3, it is noteworthy that 
dropping only one outlier out of the data was sufficient to raise the 
alpha level to .70, while both predicted interactions remained signifi-
cant (ps < .05). Given that this consideration holds no implications for 
the final interpretation of the results, we report the analyses of the 
entire sample in this article.
3. In Experiment 1, only 5.2% of the sample scored above 5.0 on 
the averaged victim-blaming measure, in Experiment 2 this was 9.3% 
of the sample, and in Experiment 3 this was only 4.8%.
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